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I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND TEXAS REGISTER ACTC HANGES in the area of state taxation have arisen due to the enactment
of article 6252-13a,' the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register
Act. This Act became effective on January 1, 1976, and applies to all agencies
having statewide jurisdiction which make rules or determine contested
cases. 2 The purpose of the Act is:
[to] afford minimum standards of uniform practice and procedure for
state agencies, to provide for public participation in the rule-making
process, to provide adequate and proper public notice of proposed
agency rules and agency actions through publication of a state register,
and to restate the law of judicial review of agency action.3
Since the Texas Comptroller's Office and Alcoholic Beverage Commission
have rule-making powers and statewide authority, they are within the defini-
tion of agency and are covered by the provisions of the Act. The Texas
Employment Commission is financed by federal funds and, therefore, takes
the position that it is exempt from the application of the Act.
A. Rules
The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act defines an agency
rule as including both substantive and procedural rules but not as encompass-
ing statements concerning only the internal management or organization of an
agency. 4 An agency must index and make its rules available for public
inspection, and if it does not, the rules cannot be invoked by the agency
except against persons who have actual knowledge of the rules.5 An agency,
therefore, has an affirmative duty to promulgate, file, and index its rules. If a
statute is clear, it is the opinion of this author that no rule has to be
promulgated. The secretary of state's office has set up a division to handle the
filing of rules under article 6252-13a.
By instruction of the secretary of state's office those rules of an agency
covered by the act which were in effect prior to January 1, 1976, were to be
* B.A., LL.B., Baylor University. Attorney, Legal Services Division, Comptroller of
Public Accounts, Austin, Texas.
I. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
2. Id. art 6252-13a(3)(1) defines "Agency" to mean:
any state board, commission, department or officer having statewide jurisdic-
tion, other than an agency wholly financed by federal funds, the legislature, the
courts, the Industrial Accident Board, and institutions of higher education, that
makes rules or determines contested cases.
See McCalla, The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act: An Overview, State Bar of
Texas, Workshop Guide for Institute on Administrative Law and Procedure (March 19, 1976)
(cassette on file at Underwood Law Library, Southern Methodist University School of Law,
Dallas, Texas, in Texas Administrative Law and Procedure, Professional Development Program
(1976)).
3. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a(1) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
4. Id. art. 6252-13a(7).
5. Id. art. 6252-13a(4)(b).
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filed with that office no later than December 31, 1975. Any new rules filed by
an agency with the secretary of state after January 1, 1976, are subject to the
notice and hearing provisions of article 6252-13a. 6 In accordance with article
6252-13a 7 the comptroller's office has filed rules for the taxes which it
administers8 and procedural rules for its administrative hearings and rule-
making procedures. 9
B. Contested Cases
Under the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act10 a contested
case is defined as "a proceeding, including but not restricted to ratemaking
and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are to be
determined by an agency after an opportunity for adjudicative hearing." 1 In
a contested case all parties must be offered an opportunity for a hearing and
must be given not less than ten days' notice. 12 The comptroller's office
considers contested cases 3 to have a broad meaning and grants hearings on
refund, redetermination request, and petitions for special reporting methods
under article 12.02.14
Article 6252-13a specifies definite procedures and means for conducting
contested cases. The notice of hearing must comport with specific require-
ments. 15 Matters may be stipulated to by the agency and the party requesting
the hearing, and depositions and subpoenas are now available for discovery
purposes. 16 Prior to the Act the comptroller did not have the power to utilize
subpoenas except in motor fuel tax and special fuel tax proceedings.' 7
6. Id. arts. 6252-13a(5), -13a(6).
7. Id.
8. The comptroller cites its tax rules in the following manner:
Comtroller's Sales Tax Ruling .001
Comptroller's Inheritance Tax Ruling .002
Comptroller's Ad Valorem Tax Ruling .003
Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .004
The comptroller's administrative hearing rules are cited as: Comptroller's Legal Services Ruling
.005. The rulings can also be found in the following looseleaf services: TEX. STATE TAX REP.
(CCH); STATE & Loc. TAXES (P-H); [TEXAS] INH. EST. & Giir TAX REP. (CCH).
9. The comptroller's rules on its hearings and rules procedures are available in a booklet
entitled "Rules of Practice and Procedure," copies of which may be obtained from the
Comptroller's Legal Services Division.
10. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
11. Id. art 6252-13a(3)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1976). See also TEX. PEN. CODE AUX, LAWS ANN.
art. 66-12 (Vernon 1975) (cancellation or suspension of permits by Alcoholic Beverage Commis-
sion requires "notice and hearing").
12. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a(13)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); TEX. TAX.-GEN.
ANN. arts. 1.032, 9.16, 10.11, 10.61, 20.021, 20.08 (Vernon 1969).
13. Comptroller's Legal Services Ruling .001(5).
14. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02 (Vernon 1969).
15. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a(13)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) provides:
The notice must include:
(1) a statement of time, place and nature of the hearing;
(2) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to
be held;
(3) a reference to the particular sections of the statute and rules involved; and
(4) a short and plain statement of the matters asserted.
See TEX. Airr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-858 (1976) holding that the Railroad Commission is required to
comply with the notice and hearing procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act in order to
issue a formal declaratory ruling which requires an interpretation of a previously adopted
commission rule.
16. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a(14) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
17. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. arts. 9.24, 10.20, 10.70 (Vernon 1969). Subpoena power of
Alcoholic Beverage Commission is not affected by the Administrative Procedure and Texas
Register Act. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. OP. No. H-650 (1975).
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After a contested case is closed a decision must be issued within sixty
days. 8 In a recent case a rule promulgated by the savings and loan commis-
sioner providing that a decision should be issued within forty-five days after a
hearing was closed was held not to be mandatory.' 9 The court did not speak
directly to the sixty-day period in article 6252-13a. It appears, however, that
the rule announced by the supreme court may likewise apply to it. Decisions
in contested cases must state fact findings separately from legal conclu-
sions. 20 The comptroller's office has changed its decision format to comply
with this requirement.
A motion for rehearing is a prerequisite for appeal in a contested case and
must be filed within fifteen days from the issuance of a decision. If a motion is
not filed within that period the decision becomes final at its expiration.2' In the
case of a sales and use tax redetermination hearing22 the decision according to
the comptroller's construction of article 6252-13a would be final after fifteen
days had elapsed with no rehearing motion having been filed. The tax liability
would then be subject to an additional ten percent penalty if not paid within
twenty days 23 from the expiration of the fifteen-day period.
The denial of a motion for rehearing sets the appeal process in motion. The
question of the manner of perfecting appeal is an open question in the area of
state taxation. The attorney general's office has filed jurisdictional pleas or
special exceptions to appeals which were filed directly from orders of the
comptroller and not in accordance with the provisions of articles 1.05 and
20.10.24 The uncertainty in this area has not yet reached the appellate stage.
One special exception was, however, recently sustained by a Travis County
district court. 25 If the attorney general is successful on appeal in requiring that
the liability be paid prior to filing suit, the nature of the appeal for fact
questions would arguably no longer be in question since the suit would not be
18. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a(16)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
19. Lewis v. Nacogdoches Say. & Loan Ass'n, 540 S.W. 2d 313 (Tex. 1976). See also
companion case, Lewis v. Jacksonville Bldg. & Loan, 540 S.W. 2d 307 (Tex. 1976).
20. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a(16)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). Comptroller's
Legal Services Ruling .037 provides:
All final decisions and orders of the agency shall be in writing or stated in the
record and when in writing shall be signed by the Comptroller. A final decision
shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Any
party, within 10 days after the conclusion of the hearing, may submit proposed
findings of fact. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be
accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts support-
ing the findings. If, in accordance with the agency rules, a party has submitted
proposed findings of fact, the decision shall include a ruling on each proposed
finding. Parties shall be notified either personally or by mail of any decision or
order. On written request, a copy of the decision or order shall be delivered or
mailed to any party and to the party's representative of record.
See Guinn, Post Hearing State, State Bar of Texas, Workshop Guide for Institute on Administra-
tive Law and Procedure (March 19, 1976) (cassette on file at Underwood Law Library, Southern
Methodist University School of Law, Dallas, Texas, in Texas Administrative Law and Proce-
dure, Professional Development Program (1976)).
21. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a(16) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); Comptroller's
Legal Services Ruling .039.
22. TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.08 (Vernon 1969).
23. Id. art. 20.08(E).
24. Id. arts. 1.05, 20.10. See also TEX. TAX. ANN. art. 7057b (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
25. Transportation Enterprises, Inc. v. Bob Bullock, Civ. No. 250,985, Dist. Ct. of Travis
County, 53d Judicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 8, 1976.
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an appeal from the administrative decision26 but would be tried de novo based
on those grounds raised in the protest letter or refund request. It will
undoubtedly take further litigation to clarify this question.
2 7
C. Rule Making
An agency is required by the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register
Act to hold an open meeting on any substantive rule promulgated after
January 1, 1976, and on any amendment to or repeal of any substantive rule
when the meeting is requested by at least twenty-five persons, by a govern-
mental subdivision or agency, or by an association having at least twenty-five
members. The procedure for requesting a hearing from the comptroller is
specified by ruling.28
26. Rowan Oil Co. v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 152 Tex. 607,263 S.W. 2d 140 (1953). See
Tyler, Texas State Inheritance Tax Law, 6 STATE BAR OFTEXAS, NEWSLETTER OFTHE SECTION OF
TAXATION, No. I, Oct. 1972, at 3-6, for discussion of "substantial evidence" and inheritance tax
appeals under TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 14.11 (Vernon 1969).
27. See generally Hamilton, The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act; Con-
tested Cases and Judicial Review, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 285 (1976). In the Report of Committee of
Administrative Practice, 10 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION,
No. 1, Oct. 1976, at 11-12, it is stated:
The point to remember is the Attorney General's Office has taken a firm
position that the money must be paid in prior to judicial review and that the only
judicial review authorized is pursuant to Article 1.05 the 'protest statute.'
Assuming that the Attorney General's position is correct, i.e., that the protest
statute is the 'method provided by law for review' of tax cases, then it would seem
to logically follow that the protest statute provides for trial de novo-it certainly
has been so applied by the District Courts of Travis County in the past. The
administrative action, to-wit, the Comptroller's Certification of tax due has
previously, by statute, given rise to a prima facie case that the tax is due and the
burden is on the taxpayer to show in what manner the Comptroller has unlawfully
demanded the payment of tax. However, the taxpayer has been able to show this
in the past through the evidence presented at the trial of the case on the merits and
the previous administrative action is only part of the relevant evidence consi-
dered. On the other hand, a strong case can be made that Article 1.05 does not
specifically refer to trial de novo. Therefore, the law being silent as to the type of
judicial review authorized, the case will be tried under the substantial evidence
rule. Insofar as the Committee on Administrative Practices is aware, no decision
has been reached as to the position that the Attorney General might take on this
issue. However, the careful attorney, using an abundance of caution, would
proceed with the case at the administrative level on the assumption that it would
be reviewed as a case 'other than by trial de novo.'
28. Comptroller's Legal Services Ruling .044 provides:
Sec. 4. Prior to the adoption, repeal of, or amendment to any rule, the agency
shall afford all interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit data, views,
or arguments, orally or in writing.
In the case of substantive rules, opportunity for public hearing shall be granted
if requested by at least 25 persons, by a governmental subdivision or agency, or
by an association having at least 25 members. The petition for a public hearing by
the parties, who can request such a hearing, should be in writing addressed to the
Legal Services Division and should state the grounds asserted for the amendment
to, repeal, or promulgation of a rule. The agency will notify the petitioning party
of the date, time, and place of public hearing. The agency in giving notice will
abide by the requirements of the Open Meetings Act. A Hearings Examiner of the
Legal Services Division shall preside over any public hearing on such rule and will
prepare a proposed recommendation on such proposed amendment, repeal, or
promulgation of such rule. The agency shall consider fully all written and oral
submissions concerning the proposed rule. All oral submissions should be made
at the public hearing. All written submissions should be made to the Legal
Services Division no later than 15 days after the public hearing. On adoption of a
rule, the agency, if requested to do so by an interested person either prior to
adoption or within 30 days after adoption, shall issue a concise statement of the
principal reasons for and against its adoption, incorporating in the statement its




The frequent question of how to determine what receipts are receipts from
business done in Texas29 has again been raised. In Bullock v. General
Dynamics Corp.30 the court was faced with determining whether receipts
from a corporation's operation on a federal enclave located in Texas should
be considered part of the corporation's Texas receipts. General Dynamics
had been engaged primarily in the manufacture and sale of defense equip-
ment, and during the years in question its operations were performed in
several Texas cities as well as within a federal enclave located in Tarrant
County, Texas.
The Buck Act3 allows states to impose certain taxes, including "income
taxes," on business conducted within federal enclaves. The Act defines
"income taxes" to mean "any tax levied on, with respect to, or measured by,
net income, gross income or gross receipts." 32 Relying heavily on a previous
supreme court decision,33 the court determined that the Texas franchise tax
was an "income tax" within the meaning of the Buck Act because it varies in
direct proportion to changes in gross income or gross receipts. If the Texas
Supreme Court affirms the court of civil appeals decision, the General
Sec. 6. The agency may use informal conferences and consultations as means
of obtaining the viewpoints and advice of interested persons concerning con-
templated rulemaking. The agency also may appoint committees of experts or
interested persons or representatives of the general public to advise it with
respect to any contemplated rulemaking. The powers of these committees are
advisory only.
Sec. 7. Any interested person may petition the agency requesting the adop-
tion of a rule. The petition should be in writing addressed to the Legal Services
Division and state the grounds for the amendment to, repeal of, or promulgation
of the rule. The agency may, if he deems it necessary, hold an informal
conference at which the petitioning party may present the grounds raised in the
written request. Within 60 days after submission of a petition, the agency either
shall deny the petition in writing, stating its reasons for the denial, or shall initiate
rulemaking proceedings in accordance with the previous provisions of this rule.
See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a(il ) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
29. In Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1967), the supreme court
determined that dividends and interest paid by a Texas payor were Texas business receipts. The
comptroller had sought to change his long-standing policy of applying a location of payor test to
determine whether dividends and interest were Texas business receipts to a commercial domicile
or business situs test. The court denied the comptroller the right to apply a different standard
because he had used a definite policy for a long period of time during which the legislature had
met and had not changed the law. See generally C. RATLIFF, INTERSTATE APPORTIONMENT OF
BUSINESS INCOME FOR STATE INCOME TAX PURPOSES (1962).
30. 533 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ granted). [Editor's Note: Since this
article was written, this decision was affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
127 (Jan. 5, 1977).] See Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .013, which provides:
The fact that sales to the Federal Government are completed on a government
reservation does not remove the receipts from such sales from franchise tax
calculations. A corporation is not relieved from payment of the franchise tax by
reason of residing in a Federal reservation and receiving income from sales and
services completed in the reservation.
31. 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110 (1970).
32. Id. § I10.
33. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 478 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1973). The court in this case held
that oil and gas occupation taxes were properly imposed on production from federal leases on a
federal enclave by deciding that the occupation taxes were in the nature of taxes measured by
income and were authorized under the Buck Act.
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Dynamics case would have a decided effect on the franchise tax liability of
government contractors operating within the State of Texas.
Under a rather confusing state of facts the court in Bullock v. Electro-
Science Investors, Inc. 34 refused relief to the taxpayer who had brought a
protest suit to recover $6,779.64. In 1968 Electro-Science had sought recov-
ery of $97,820.86 which represented franchise taxes paid under protest. Three
cases were consolidated in the litigation, 35 but prior to the consolidation
Electro-Science moved in Cause No. 127,416 to sever two issues pertaining to
two different tax periods. These issues were (1) in one period the comptroller
had employed a wrong method of computation resulting in an excess payment
of $9,842.79, and (2) in the other period an overpayment had been made in the
sum of $6,743.70. The trial court ordered the severance of these issues into
Cause No. 127,416A. In the other causes judgment was entered on appeal
against the plaintiffs. 36
In Cause No. 127,416A motions for summary judgment were filed by both
parties. The court granted the motion of Electro-Science and awarded
judgment for $9,842.79. The $6,743.70 sum was not covered by this judgment.
The judgment for $9,842.79 was affirmed on appeal.37
Electro-Science brought a separate action to recover the amount of
$6,779.64 and the trial court awarded judgment for $6,743.70, which was the
sum ordered severed in 1968. It appears that the entire amount of money paid
under protest by Electro-Science was $107,663.65. The sum of $9,842.79
recovered in the second case was precisely the difference between
$107,663.65 and the amount of $97,820.86 as to which the taxpayer had been
denied recovery. The state contended that the $6,743.70 amount was not
separated from the funds in the main suit and remained in the judgment for
$97,820.86. The state argued that since the $6,743.70 was included in the
earlier judgment it had been transferred out of suspense into general revenue
and, therefore, was not recoverable.
The court of civil appeals held that Electro-Science had shown no authority
under which it could bring the suit and decided that since the suit was not filed
within ninety days from the date on which the taxes were paid under protest
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.38 The case would also
seem to be sound authority for the position that a suit cannot be instituted to
recover any moneys which are not paid under protest at the time of payment.
34. 533 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
35. Capital Sw. Corp. v. Calvert, Civ. No. 128,252, Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial
Dist. of Texas, May 29, 1968; Electro-Science Investors, Inc. v. Calvert, Civ. No. 127,416, Dist.
Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial Dist. of Texas, May 29, 1968; and Texas Capital Corp. v.
Calvert, Civ. No. 127, 415, Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial Dist. of Texas, May 29,
1968, were consolidated and heard by the court in Cause No. 128,252.
36. Calvert v. Capital Sw. Corp., 441 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.- Austin, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 321 (1969).
37. Calvert v. Electro-Science Investors, Inc., 509 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1974, no writ).
38. 533 S.W.2d at 895. The court cited as precedent Stetler v. Calvert, 456 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1970, no writ). See Mobile Homes of America, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 527
S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) (corporation owing franchise taxes not
able to sue to recover funds which might be used to pay the taxes).
[Vol. 31
TAXATION
B. Miscellaneous Franchise Tax Matters
An opinion of the Texas attorney general39 has caused a change in a
comptroller's tuling.4° The prior policy of the comptroller had been to treat
the receipts from the sale of oil or gas by a producer to an interstate pipeline
company when title and possession passed in Texas as not constituting
receipts from Texas business. The ruling, which was issued pursuant to the
attorney general opinion, is being applied both prospectively and retroactive-
ly by the comptroller. In the opinion the attorney general determined that the
comptroller's prior construction was incorrect. This author notes that it can
certainly be argued that the comptroller should not be bound by his prior
policy since it was not legally authorized by the statute, as opposed to a
situation where the construction was longstanding and the statute was am-
biguous.4 A number of cases have been filed on this question but to date have
not been tried.12
A number of administrative decisions have been issued regarding the
franchise tax.43 These decisions dealt with the use of the short form,"4 the
equity method of accounting, 45 profits from inter-company sales, 46 and
various other subjects.47
39. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-640 (1975). This opinion dealt with the computation of
franchise tax for Texas gas producers and the effect of sales from such producers to interstate
pipeline companies. Under the facts presented, title to and possession of the products purchased
passed to the interstate pipelines within Texas. The attorney general concluded the sales were
intrastate sales and "business done in Texas" for purposes of computing the producer-vendor's
franchise taxes both before and after the 1969 amendment to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN.. art. 12.02
(Vernon 1969).
40. Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .013(4)(a) now states: "The sale of oil or gas by a
Texas producer to an interstate pipeline company, with delivery and passage of title and
possession in Texas, results in receipts from business done in Texas."
41. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Calvert, 527 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tex. 1975); Humble Oil & Ref. Co.
v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1967).
42. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Bullock, Civ. No. 251,778, Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 200th
Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug. 26, 1976; Continental Oil Co. v. Bullock, Civ. No. 251,748, Dist. Ct.
of Travis County, 201st Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug. 25, 1976; Enserch Exploration, Inc. v.
Bullock, Civ. No. 250,811, Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 52d Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug. 5, 1976.
43. Summaries of Comptroller's Administrative Decisions are published in TEXAS LAW-
YERS' WEEKLY DIGEST; TEXAS LEGISLATIVE SERVICE; NEWSLETTER OFTHE SECTION OF TAXATION,
STATE BAR OF TEXAS; and the TEXAS REGISTER. The summaries of the decisions can be
found in STATE & LOCAL TAXES (P-H). Copies of the underlying decisions can also be obtained
without charge by contacting the Legal Services Division, P.O. Box 13528, Austin, Texas 78711.
44. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6994 (1976) decided that once a corporation
makes an election to file on the optional short form basis, it can not after the June 15th filing date
amend its return and file under a long form. See Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .002(2).
45. Since Comptroller's Franchise Tax Ruling 80-0.06 required a corporation to file its
franchise tax returns in conformity with its books, a corporation which made annual adjustments
on its books reflecting use of the "equity method" of accounting was required to file its franchise
tax report based on the use of this method, thereby including in its surplus the amount which it
annually added to its "Investment Subsidies" account. Comptroller's Administrative Decision
Nos. 6961, 7178 (1976). See also Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .0 15(2)(d). Pursuant to these
and other similar decisions, suits have been filed contesting this interpretation. See Southwestern
Inv. Co. v. Bullock, Civ. No. 250,198, Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 53d Judicial Dist. of Texas,
July 20, 1976; Teledyne, Inc. v. Bullock, Civ. No. 245,873, Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 53d
Judicial Dist. of Texas, Mar. 31, 1976.
46. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7184 (1976) held that a corporation must
include profits from intercompany sales in its surplus for franchise tax purposes and cannot defer
such profits merely because its sales are made to controlled or subsidiary corporations. See
Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .013(2)(q).
47. In comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7422 (1976), it was decided that debentures
transferred in consideration for the purchase of property represent taxable debt for franchise tax
purposes even though the transaction is a tax free exchange made in accordance with I.R.C. §
351.
1977]
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III. SALES AND USE TAXES
The distinction between service versus sale was the major controversy in a
recent case in the sales and use tax arena. In Statistical Tabulating Corp. v.
Bullock48 the keypunching of computer cards was determined to be a service4 9
and not subject to the Texas Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act.
Statistical Tabulating furnished the cards and imprinted data on them with
information furnished by its customers. The crux of the court's opinion was
as follows: "it may not be assumed or implied that the Legislature intended
also to tax intangible data as materials furnished by a customer wanting the
data transferred to cards suitable for computer calculations or recording. The
Legislature made it clear that the tax should fall only on 'tangible personal
property.' "50
It appears that the court's concern was from the viewpoint of what the
customers were furnishing Statistical Tabulating rather than what Statistical
Tabulating was furnishing its customers. Since the Texas Supreme Court has
granted a writ of error on this case the comptroller has another opportunity to
argue the taxability of the transactions. The supreme court might well differ
with the court of civil appeals decision, or at least might clarify the question of
the nature of the item being transferred by Statistical Tabulating."' The
taxation of service related activities has not been looked upon with favor by
Texas courts.52
Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7039 (1976) held that all corporations who compute
their franchise tax by using the assessed value of their property for county ad valorem purposes
must include all the property which they own on the last day of their fiscal year. See TEX. ATr'Y
GEN. Op. No. S-196 (1956) (regarding first year corporation filing a franchise tax return);
Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .011(3).
Receipts from service fees and transfer charges on loan contracts are receipts from the
rendition of services for franchise tax purposes and are allocable to Texas under TEX. TAX.-GEN.
ANN. art. 12.02(I)(b)(ii) (Vernon 1969) when performed in Texas. Comptroller's Administrative
Decision No. 7016 (1976). See Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .013(2)(q) regarding receipts
from intercorporate charges for services rendered as Texas receipts.
Sales of insulin, drugs, and medicines by a manufacturer who purchases these items out-of-
state under a resale certificate and sells them in Texas to hospitals, wholesalers, and retailers
were held not to be excludable under TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(l)(c) (Vernon 1969) from
Texas gross receipts for franchise tax purposes since such sales did not qualify for exemption
under id. art. 20.04(M) as sales by a licensed practitioner. Comptroller's Administrative Decision
No. 7003 (1976); Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .013(3)(f).
48. 538 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ granted). [Editor's Note: Since this
article was written, this decision was affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 24
(Mar. 19, 1977).]
49. In Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6087 (1975), the punching of information
onto a card for computer use was held to constitute the processing or imprinting of tangible
personal property within the meaning of TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(K)(2)(a) (Vernon 1969).
Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling .028-Computers, Services and Software. The engraving of
trophies has also been held to be processing. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6833
(1976).
50. 538 S.W.2d at 261.
51. In Commercial Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976), the Tennessee
court held that the keypunching of computer cards is a service and not the sale of tangible
personal property.
52. In Williams & Lee Scouting Serv., Inc. v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1970, writ ref'd), the furnishing of scouting reports was determined to be the performance
of a service. Among other considerations the court looked to the cost of compiling and furnishing
the reports and the fact that the reports could have been supplied in other than written form. See
also Calvert v. Julian Gold, Inc. 479"S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(charges for altering women's dresses were held to be charges for remodeling and excluded from
the definition of receipts and sales price); TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. arts. 20.01(D)(2)(g), (L)(3)(g)
(Vernon 1969). See Ball, What is a Salefor Sales Tax Purposes?, 9 VAND. L. REV. 227 (1956).
1977] TAXATION
The comptroller's purchase invoice method of auditing grocery stores was
upheld in the refund suit of Baker v. Bullock.53 In auditing grocery stores the
comptroller employs an optional reporting method provided for retail gro-
cers.54 This procedure involves determining the grocer's tax liability by the
calculation of a fraction. The fraction consists of the total of the taxpayer's
purchases of tax exempt merchandise as the numerator and his total merchan-
dise purchases as the denominator. His gross sales are then multiplied by this
fraction and the result is subtracted from gross sales to obtain taxable sales.
The current tax rate is applied to the taxable sales to obtain the tax due. The
comptroller uses this method of auditing to verify a grocer's reported liability
and does not rely on the grocer's cash register tapes. In the Baker case the
taxpayer did not present any records to substantiate his contentions regard-
ing, among other things, failure to consider mark-up differences and transfers
between stores.
The court ruled that the taxpayer must show not only that he overpaid his
taxes, but the exact amount of overpayment. The effect of the Baker case is
to require retail grocers to have evidence other than cash register tapes to
refute a comptroller's audit, such as actual records reflecting their mark-up
on various items, their beginning and ending purchases, and sales of loss
leaders.
Numerous administrative decisions have been issued by the comptroller
involving sales and use tax. These decisions cover agreements to pay taxes, 55
use of direct permits, 56 and accrual of interest during redetermination. 7 Two
important administrative decisions involve the storage and use exclusion and
the definition of place of business for local sales and use tax purposes. A
53. 529 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
54. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.05 (I)(l)(a) (Vernon 1969); Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling
.048 (requiring purchase invoice records to be maintained for four years to verify a grocer's sales
tax returns). See also Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6727 (1976) holding that the
15% reporting method for retail grocers provided in TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.05(l)(l)(b)
(Vernon 1969) will not be given retroactive effect but is prospective only in nature and
Comptroller's Administration Decision No. 6601 (1976) determining that failure to keep records
is not a defense to a sales tax assessment when the comptroller makes a reasonable estimation and
reconstruction of taxable sales. Beer was held to be taxable for sales tax purposes in Comptrol-
ler's Administrative Decision No. 6984 (1976).
55. See Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7126 (1976) (each partner is liable and
may be assessed underTEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. arts. 20.02-021 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) for the sales
tax liability incurred by the partnership regardless of an agreement between the partners whereby
one partner assumed all debts of the partnership); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No.
7014 (1976) (an agreement between the seller of a business and a purchaser providing the seller
would pay all debts of the business held not in any way to affect the purchaser's duty to withhold
and remit to the comptroller a sufficient amount from the purchase price to cover the seller's sales
tax delinquency pursuant to TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.09(I) (Vernon 1969)). See also Kimbell
Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 401 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (purchaser of business
took property subject to state's lien filed to cover delinquent taxes of seller); Comptroller's Sales
Tax Ruling .046-Liability Incurred by Purchase of a Business; Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 1181 (1975).
56. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6985 (1976) decided that in the absence of an
agency relationship a lump sum contractor cannot present the direct pay permit of its customer in
lieu of paying the amount of sales tax due when it purchases materials to be used in the
performance of a job for the customer, since the lump sum contractor is the consumer of the
materials and a direct pay permit is neither assignable nor transferable. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
20.05(K) (Vernon 1969); Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling .008. See also Able Irrigation Co. v.
Calvert, 495 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, no writ) (lump sum contractor held to be
the consumer of tangible personal property used in performance of contract).
57. It was determined in Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7043 (1976) that interest
continues to accrue on the amount of tax owed until it is paid, including the time a requested
redetermination is being made by the comptroller.
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recent decision58 held that a purchaser who both purchases and takes delivery
of tangible personal property within Texas and who then removes the
property from Texas for use solely outside of Texas is subject to sales and use
tax. The comptroller's hearings examiner determined that article 20.01(O) 59
did not exempt such a purchase. To gain exemption the item must be
purchased outside of Texas, stored in Texas, and then removed from Texas
for use. 60
In a local tax jurisdiction where the local tax is applied to sales from a
retailer's place of business, a "place of business" is defined by a comptrol-
ler's ruling6' as not including a warehouse or storage location from which sales
are not regularly made. In accordance with this ruling the examiner 62 decided
that a warehouse where goods were merely stored and inspected and no
orders were taken was not a "place of business."
The comptroller has also decided 63 that a foreign corporation operating in
Texas through a representative, who distributed catalogs, order forms, and
price lists to Texas customers, but who did not take orders, was responsible
for payment of tax on all its sales to its Texas customers as a "retailer engaged
in business in this State" within the meaning of article 20.031(B)(2). 6 The
comptroller determined that the representative was creating a demand for the
taxpayer's product and came within the statutory language of "for the
purpose of selling" in article 20.031 (B)(2). 65 This decision further minimized
the amount of contact necessary to make a person subject to taxation by a
state.6 Other decisions in the sales and use tax field involve unjust enrich-
ment, 67 the definition of "sales price," 68 and general taxability questions. 69
58. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6811 (1976).
59. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(0) (Vernon 1969) provides:
Storage and Use Exclusion. 'Storage' and 'Use' do not include the keeping,
retaining or exercising of any right or power over tangible personal property for
the purpose of subsequently transporting it outside the State for use thereafter
solely outside the State, or for the purpose of being processed, fabricated or
manufactured into, attached to, or incorporated into, other tangible personal
property to be transported outside the State, and thereafter used solely outside
the State.
60. Id. art. 20.04(G)(3)(b) (1969).
61. Comptroller's Local Taxes Ruling .004(2).
62. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6689 (1976). It was further held in this
decision that if tangible personal property is sold by salesmen employed at certain sales offices in
Texas and delivery of the property is made to customers from storage warehouses, the sales
offices are considered as the places of business at which the sales are consummated for local sales
and use tax purposes,
63. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6491 (1975).
64. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.031(B)(2) (Vernon 1969). See also Calvert v. American Int'l
Television, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, no writ).
65. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.031(B)(2) (Vernon 1969).
66. Standard Press Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975); National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 754 (1967); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362
U.S. 207 (1960); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth, Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); National Geographic Soc'y
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 16 Cal. 3d 637, 547 P.2d 458, 128 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1975), petition for
cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3104 (U.S. June 14, 1976) (No. 75-1868), probjuris. noted, 45 U.S.L.W.
3280 (U.S. Oct. 12,1976). See generally P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
149-61 (1953).
67. If sales tax is collected upon nontaxable transactions, the state can require under the
doctrine of unjust enrichment that the person collecting the amounts either remit them to the state
or demonstrate that they have been refunded to the persons from whom they were collected.
Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6623 (1976); see Comptroller's General Ruling
.003-Unjust Enrichment.
68. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7406 (1976) ("handling charge" added to




As was noted in the previous Survey article, 7° the Texas Supreme Court in
Citizens National Bank v. Calvert7' reversed the judgment of the court of civil
appeals and ruled that a percentage based on the ratio of the Texas net estate
to total net estate should be used to determine the amount of additional
inheritance tax due where the decedent's estate was located partly within and
partly without the State of Texas. 72 The comptroller had applied a percentage
based on Texas gross estate to total gross estate. The court concluded that the
comptroller's interpretation would be helpful were the statute ambiguous 73
but was inapplicable here because the interpretation was contrary to the
words of the statute.
In Carroll v. Bullock74 the court had to determine whether article
14.01(D), 75 which provides that the basic inheritance tax "shall not apply to
residents of those states which have no inheritance tax law," 76 applies only to
a nonresident decedent or a nonresident beneficiary who resides in a state
which has an estate tax law but no inheritance tax law. The decedent, a Texas
resident, left a will naming the plaintiff, who was her grandson and a New
York resident, the sole beneficiary and independent executor. The court
determined that the word "resident" refers only to decedents who are
residents of states which have no inheritance tax law and does not apply to a
nonresident beneficiary. 77
Administrative Decision No. 6924 (1976) (charge for serving food at private party which was
separated from charge for food was taxable as part of "sales price" of food); Comptroller's
Administrative Decision No. 6699 (1976) (when seller or lessor requires purchaser or lessee to pay
maintenance charge in connection with sale or lease of equipment, maintenance charge is
considered part of sale or lease price for sales and use tax purposes, Comptroller's Sales Tax
Ruling .014); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6697 (1976) (manufacturer of drill bits
was taxable on the entire charge for bits even though material charge was separated from labor
charge).
69. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7389 (1976) (floating clamshell dredge not
used to transport persons or property not exempt as vessel under TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
20.04(P) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7299 (1976) (sale of photo-
graphs through vending machines on federal enclave subject to sales and use tax); Comptroller's
Administrative Decision No. 7105 (1976) (purchaser subject to tax on purchase price for personal
use of aircraft); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7063 (1976) (contractor improving
realty under lump sum contract is consumer, not retailer, of taxable items which he incorporates
and such contractor is not entitled to bad debt deduction for such items); Comptroller's
Administrative Decision No. 7054 (1976) (sales through mechanical devices not activated by
deposit of money held not exempted by vending machine exemption in TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
20.04(U) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6938 (1976) (taxable sale
rather than repair when headwell of videomachine sent for "repair" and party sending the
headwell assured only of receiving in return reconditioned headwell, though not necessarily same
unit as one sent, because term "repair" contemplates restoring same unit to original working
condition); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6320 (1976) ("Ruff-coating" of pipe
taxable as processing of tangible personal property); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No.
6262 (1976) (purchases made in anticipation of need for increased facilities to generate power and
not to fulfill specific third party contract not exempt under prior contract exemption).
70. Tracy, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 356, 359 (1976).
71. 527 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1975).
72. The court held that the plain meaning of the language used by the legislature in art.
14.12(D) precludes the method of calculation advanced by the comptroller. See generally Annot.,
71 A.L.R.3d 247 (1976).
73. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1967) (administrative
construction of ambiguous statute upheld).
74. 530 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
75. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 14.01(D) (Vernon 1969).
76. Id.
77. See Comptroller's Inheritance Tax Ruling .068 regarding acquisition of property in
Texas by a nonresident.
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One noteworthy event that could certainly affect the area of state inheri-
tance tax revenue is the proceeding pending in Houston to determine whether
Howard Hughes was domiciled in Texas.78 If a decision is rendered that
Hughes was domiciled in Texas, a significant sum of inheritance taxes will be
due the comptroller. The state has filed an appearance in the proceeding for
the purpose of determining domicile and protecting its inheritance tax lien.
The comptroller has issued a few administrative decisions regarding inheri-
tance tax79 during the survey period. The Texas attorney general has deter-
mined that the comptroller may require county or probate clerks to file a
"county clerk report" in lieu of filing certified copies of the inventory and
appraisement, the list of claims, and the last will or, in the absence of a will,
proof of heirship;80 but he may not extend from twenty to forty-five days the
time within which the clerk is required to file the report. 8'
The comptroller's office has initiated training seminars on inheritance
taxes for its field personnel so that the field offices can offer more com-
prehensive assistance to persons regarding the filing of inheritance tax
returns .82
V. MISCELLANEOUS STATE TAX MATTERS
A portion of the Texas admissions tax was declared unconstitutional in
ABC Interstate Theatres, Inc. v. Bullock.8 3 The trial court entered judgment
that section 2 of article 21.01,84 which imposes a tax on admissions to motion
78. In re Howard Hughes, Decedent, No. 139,362, Probate Court No. 2 of Harris County,
Texas, April 14, 1976.
79. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7140 (1976) (personal representative not
authorized by TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) to disclaim legacy to
decedent and his attempt without legal effect for inheritance tax purposes); Comptroller's
Administrative Decision No. 6896 (1976) ("succession duty" paid to British Columbia not
permissible inheritance tax deduction since it was not federal, state, county or municipal tax or
debt due estate); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6245 (1976) (upon simultaneous
death of husband and wife, one-half value of proceeds of community property life insurance
policy which insured husband's life and made payable to trust held includable in wife's estate);
Comptroller's Inheritance Tax Ruling .033.
80. Pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 14.14(B) (Vernon 1969).
81. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-804 (1976); see Comptroller's Inheritance Tax Ruling .009.
TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.034 (Vernon 1969) provides: "Notwithstanding the provision of any
Article of this Title, the Comptroller may revise any report required by any Article of this Title so
as to eliminate any specific information required by the provisions of any Article of this Title."
See Eldridge v. Marshall Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no conflict of interest when attorney general represents both comptroller
in collection of inheritance taxes and state in will construction of charitable trust because statute
authorizes representation:).
82. In Chairman's Message, 10 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION OF
TAXATION, No. 1, Oct. 1976, at 2, it is stated:
The new Committee on Liason with the Comptroller's Office, Charles W. Hall,
Chairman, has been established to provide a means whereby the Comptroller's
Office and private practitioners can discuss mutual problems that need to be
addressed. It is hoped that an arrangement similar to the Liason Committee with
the Internal Revenue Service can be established.
The Committee on Inheritance Taxes, Edward C. Osterberg, Jr., Chairman,
has prepared two legislative proposals which will be submitted for inclusion in the
State Bar's legislative program, one exempting a non-employee spouse's com-
munity interest in qualified pension and profit sharing plans from inheritance tax,
and the other dealing with computation of inheritance taxes on non-Texas
property.
83. Civ. No. 238,138, Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Sept. 3, 1975.
84. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 21.02(2) (Vernon 1969) provides:
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pictures held at a fixed or regularly established motion picture theater, was
unconstitutional8 5 This judgment was not appealed, and the comptroller's
office is abiding by the trial court's decision. The comptroller is, however,
imposing a sales and use tax on rentals of film from distributors to exhibitors.
These rentals had been exempted by article 20.04(Z), 86 which provides:
There are exempted from the taxes imposed by this chapter the receipts
from the leasing or licensing of motion picture films of any kind to or by
motion picture theatres which are subject to admissions taxes as imposed
by Chapter 21, Title 122A, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as
amended, and to or by licensed television stations.
Since the admissions tax on motion picture theatres has been held unconstitu-
tional" and the theatres are no longer subject to it, the comptroller has taken
the position that film rentals to or by such theatres are not exempt. 88 Before
any admission tax paid pursuant to article 21.02(2) is refunded89 the comptrol-
ler is auditing to determine the amount of sales tax due and is requiring that the
sales tax be paid.
In Horton v. Cook" the gross receipts tax9' on sales of mixed alcoholic
beverages was attacked. The plaintiffs contested the fact that mixed alcoholic
beverage permittees are taxed at a rate of ten percent on their gross receipts
whereas wine and beer retailer permittees are not required to pay a gross
receipts tax. Sales by wine and beer permittees are limited to vinous or malt
fermented liquor containing no more than fourteen percent alcohol. Mixed
beverage permittees are permitted to sell beverages of unlimited alcoholic
content. It was argued that there should be no tax differential since both
permittees sell beverages containing alcohol. The court found that the clas-
sification was properly based on obvious differences between the two classes
of businesses. One of these differences was the time and method of recouping
the cost of the materials used in sales or rendering of services. 92
As noted in the previous Survey93 the attorney general has determined that
article 1.07(1)(f)(ii), 9 which permits the comptroller to issue a notice to a bank
or savings and loan institution asserting a claim to a deposit and thereby
There is hereby levied on each admission to entertainments such as motion
pictures, operas, plays and like amusements held at a fixed or regularly estab-
lished motion picture theater, where the admission charged is in excess of One
Dollar and Five Cents ($1.05) and not more than One Dollar and Fifteen Cents
($1.15) a tax of one cent (1$); and where the admission charged is in excess of One
Dollar and Fifteen Cents ($1.15) a tax of two cents (2$) plus one cent (1$)on each
ten cents (10$) or fractional part thereof in excess of One Dollar and Twenty-five
Cents ($1.25).
85. In Calvert v. McLemore, 163 Tex. 562,358 S.W.2d 551 (1%2), TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
21.02, § I (Vernon 1969) which imposed an admission tax of one cent on each ten cents paid as on
admission to entertainments held at places other than at a fixed or regularly established motion
picture theater where the admission charged exceeded fifty-one cents, was held unconstitutional.
86. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(Z) (Vernon 1969) became effective on October 1, 1969.
87. See notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text.
88. Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling .014.
89. See TEX. A-r'v GEN. Op. No. H-810 (1976) (authorization in General Appropriations Bill
enacted by 64th Legislature for comptroller to refund admissions taxes collected under uncon-
stitutional statute).
90. 538 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
91. TEX. PEN. CODE Aux. LAWS ANN. art. 666-20d (Vernon 1975).
92. 538 S.W.2d at 224.
93. Tracy, supra note 70, at 382 n.131.
94. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.07(l)(f)(ii) (Vernon 1969).
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freeze the account, is constitutional.95 The comptroller uses this provision as
part of its procedure for the collection of delinquent taxes. In the collection of
delinquent sales and use taxes the comptroller has successfully, used the
seizure and sale provision of article 20.09(H).'
Administrative decisions regarding hotel occupancy taxes,97 limitations
problems, 98 and other general matters" have also been issued by the comp-
troller's office during the survey period.
VI. AD VALOREM TAXES
This survey period has seen the rendition of some important decisions in
the area of ad valorem taxes. In Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages °0 the United
States Supreme Court allowed a nondiscriminatory Georgia property tax to
be imposed on imported goods that were no longer in import transit but were
awaiting distribution from a warehouse to dealers. 101 Many of the goods were
stored in their "original package."
95. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-720 (1975). See also TEX. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 20.09(A)(Vernon 1969); TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-827 (1976) (sheriff or constable can require indemnity
bond from demanding officers as an individual when there is a genuine reasonable doubt about
legal availability of personal property to satisfy judgment against taxpayer); TEX. TAX.-GEN.
ANN. art. 20.09(G)(4) (Vernon 1969); Johnson, Use of Injunctions in State Tax Cases, 6 STATE
BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 2, April 1973, at 1-5.
96. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.09 (H) (Vernon 1969).
97. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6924 (1976) ("corkage charge" covering
only the transportation and storage of a customer's own liquor to a customer's room not taxable);
Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6909 (1976) (charges for special preparation of room,
being charges for readying room for occupancy, are part of consideration for room rental even
though separated from flat rental fee for room); see TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 23.01(b) (Vernon
1969).
98. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7031 (1976) (claim for refund filed by diesel
fuel bonded import user permittee required to be timely under TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 10.14(Vernon 1969), and id. art. 1.045 not available to obtain refund if time period elapsed under art.
10.14); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 5878 (1976) (claim for refund for taxes
becoming due and payable prior to July 1, 1967, the effective date of TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
1.045 (Vernon 1969), not timely made when filed more than seven years after Sept. 1, 1965); see
Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6360 (1975) regarding limitations for sales and use
assessments (TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. arts. 1.045(A), (B) (Vernon 1969)); TEX. AT'Y GEN. Op. No.
H-811 (1976) holding that taxes levied on public utility are part of its receipts for assessment
purposes.
.99. See Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6640 (1975) (TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
6.03(D)(3) (Vernon 1969) not applicable to rental vehicles rented for more than 31 days because
tax base for status change from rental to lease units "owner's book value," not "total
consideration"); Comptroller's Motor Vehicle Tax Ruling .021; City of Jacksonville v. Entex,
Inc., 538 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.- Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (city's imposition of
reimbursement charge for consultant fee under TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 11.03 (Vernon 1969)
unconstitutional).
100. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
101. In J. HOWELL, PROPERTY TAXES, 21 TEXAS PRACTICE § 66 (Supp. 1976), it is observed:
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages overruled Low v. Austin and other cases holding
that inventories were not exempt simply because they were imported from a
foreign country. . . . The court observed the specific abuses which led the
framers to include the clause in the Constitution, saying that one of the major
defects of the Articles of Confederation was that seaboard states were deriving
revenue by imposting taxes on imported goods destined for customers in inland
states. Nothing in the history of the Import-Export Clause even remotely
suggests that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax which is also imposed
on imported goods that are no longer in import transit was the type of exaction
that was regarded as objectionable by the framers of the Constitution ...
Imported goods should be treated no differently from the common mass of
property in the country insofar as state and local taxation is concerned.
For a discussion of prior import-export cases see HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION,
CASES AND MATERIALS 273-302 (1969). In addition, in 40 FEDERATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS,
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Following the rationale in Michelin, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the
imposition of nondiscriminatory ad valorem taxes on personal property
storefl in unopened containers in warehouses in City of Farmers Branch v.
Matsushita Electric Corp. of America102 and City of Farmers Branch v.
American Honda Motor Co. 103 Petitions for writ of certiorari were filed in the
United States Supreme Court contesting the retroactive application of the
taxes. Petitioners contended that the Texas court erred in not following the
standards established for civil cases regarding prospective application of the
United States Supreme Court decisions. 1°4 The taxes assessed by Farmers
Branch had been for the year 1972. The taxes imposed in Michelin were for
the years 1972 and 1973. A motion for rehearing filed by Michelin raising this
point was overruled by the United States Supreme Court. The same result
occurred regarding the two Texas cases.
The Texas Supreme Court has again spoken in the area of the purely public
charity exemption. In City of McAllen v. The Evangelical Lutheran Good
Samaritan Society105 the court held that the Society's operation of an inter-
mediate nursing home met the requirements for being a purely public charity
and was, therefore, exempt under the Texas Constitution'06 and article
7150(7).1°7 Patients admitted to the home had to be under the care of a
physician. 108 The daily rates charged were based on the level of care required
as well as on the classification of the patient as private or welfare. Welfare
patients were charged a lesser rate than those who could pay the full cost of
their care. More than one-half of the patients were welfare patients. The
Society received less than the average daily cost on these patients and had to
absorb the remainder of the costs. Approximately ten percent of the patients
had a private source of funds but still received supplemental welfare pay-
ments which did not cover the entire cost of their care. The nursing home paid
the difference for this category of patients. There were no patients who
completely failed to contribute to the costs of their care. The home had an
open admissions policy but did require each prospective patient to obtain the
signature of a "responsible party" as part of the admission agreement. This
information was used not only for payment purposes but for notification in
the event of the death of the patient.
The contention was made that a public charity had to dispense "absolute"
gratuity and that the home's policy of requiring those who could pay to do so
TAX ADMINISTRATORS NEWS, No. 6, June 1976, at 62, see suggested guidelines by the Georgia
Commissioner of Revenue for determining whether a state tax violates the Import-Export clause,
to wit:
Whether the tax is on imports because they are imports, whether it is used as a
protective tariff, whether it is applied selectively to encourage or discourage
imports, whether it deprives the federal government of its exclusive right to
revenues from imports or duties on imports, and whether the tax interferes with
the free flow of imported goods among the States.
102. 537 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 164, 50L.Ed. 2d 139 (1976).
103. 537 S.W.2d 454 (Tex.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 161, 50L.Ed. 2d 137 (1976).
104. 45 U.S.L.W. 3155, 3156 (1976).
105. 530 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1975).
106. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a).
107. TEX. TAX. ANN. art. 7150(7) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
108. In the Preface to J. HOWELL, supra note 101, at 3, it is noted: "The services rendered
were similar to those rendered by hospitals. The court followed the leading hospital case rather
than the old age home cases."
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and the making of supplemental payments for those who could not pay all
their costs did not meet the test. The court stated in what was a major holding
in the decision:
With the advent of present day social security and welfare programs,
the traditional concept of charity, involving the extension of free serv-
ices to the poor and almsgiving, will be rarely found since wide ranging
assistance is available to the poor under such programs. . . The
ultimate consideration then, should be based upon an evaluation of the
total operation of the institution engaged in humanitarian activities
whose services are rendered at cost or less and which are maintained to
care for the physical and mental well-being of the recipients. By that total
operation the institution must assume, to a material extent, that which
otherwise might become the obligation or duty of the community or the
state. 109
Furthermore, the court overruled its holding in Hilltop Village, Inc. v.
Kerrville Independent School District 0 that an institution in order to meet
constitutional and statutory requirements for tax exemption had to pledge its
property and assets in perpetuity to the relief of persons in financial need and
to their assistance in obtaining care, by stating:
We hold the Society's dedication of the McAllen home to
charitable purposes and the pledge of the property and assets,
upon dissolution, to a non-profit fund, foundation or corporation
organized and operated exclusively for charitable and religious
purposes does meet the constitutional and statutory requirements
of a purely public charity.' I
The court determined that the requirement of a signature of a "responsible
party""' 2 did not prevent the Society from being a purely public charity
because the evidence reflected that inability to pay was not an obstacle to
admission. Thus, it is the opinion of this author that the court did not
overrule the requirement for an open admissions policy. Justice Steakley's
dissent expresses doubt as to what the current charitable rule is." 3 The
109. 530 S.W.2d at 810. In Hartt, Ad Valorem Taxes and Non-Profit Health-Care Facilities,
39 TEX. B.J. 864, 874 (1976) the City of McAllen case was commented upon as follows:
The potential impact of the city's contention would have affected almost every
health care provider in Texas which claimed a charitable exemption. Because of
the common availability of one or more of these programs to most indigent
persons in need of health care, few providers today fail to receive at least some
form of government reimbursement for such care. The significent [sic] factor,
however, is that while these programs pay part of the costs of health care, rarely,
if ever, do they pay all of the cost. Appreciating this reality, the court held that the
absolute gratuity requirement meant that such charity as was extended, i.e., the
portion of the cost not covered by government funds, must be of an 'uncondition-
al nature.' In such cases, the 'ultimate consideration' is whether the institution's
'total operation' materially alleviates what would otherwise be a public burden.
See also River Oaks Garden Club v. City of Houston, 370 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. 1963); City of
Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n, 1.11 Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978 (1921).
110. 426 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. 1968).
I11. 530S.W.2dat8l.
112. The following notation is made in Hartt, supra note 109, at 874: "A similar factual issue
was determined adversely to the institution claiming an exemption in Hilltop Village. Without
attempting to distinguish its opinion in Hilltop Village, the Court held that to the extent that it was
inconsistent with the instant case, Hilltop Village was overruled." See also Challenge Homes,
Inc. v. County of Lubbock, 474 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
113. 530 S.W.2d at 812-13 (Steakley, J., dissenting). J. HOWELL, supra note 101, at 26,
observes that this may be a landmark case. San Antonio Conservation Soc'y, Inc. v. City of San
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holding in the case has certainly left questions which can only be answered
by subsequent litigation. In another area of ad valorem tax exemptions
property occupied exclusively by a church's minister of music was held to
be exempt in City of Amarillo v. Paramount Terrace Christian Church"4
pursuant to article 7150b,' 15 which exempts from taxation any property
owned exclusively by a church for the exclusive use as a dwelling place for
the ministry of the church. A church camp was determined not to be exempt
as "an actual place of religious worship" in Davies v. Meyer." 6 Another
case of particular importance was Gragg v. Cayuga Independent School
District,"7 which interpreted the agricultural use designation for assessment
purposes found in the Texas Constitution." 8 The court determined
that the "primary occupation and source of income" language contemplates
"gross" rather than "net" income, that the word "primary" does not
require a farmer or rancher to receive more than fifty percent of his total
gross income from his farming or ranching business, and that only sources
of gross income from occupations or business ventures carried on for profit
should be compared with gross income from agricultural sources in
determining eligibility for the agricultural use designation." 9 Other cases
and attorney general opinions during the survey period covered a broad
range of subjects, but were not of great importance. This classification
included ad valorem tax procedures,2 0 payment by check,' and other
Antonio, 455 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1970), in which the court extended the definition of charity to
include more than alms-giving or the relief of poverty and distress, is similarly important.
114. 530 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In McCreless v. City
of San Antonio, 454 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. 1970), the residence of a district superintendent was also
held exempt.
115. TEX. TAX. ANN. art. 7150b (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); TEX. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2(a).
116. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 459 (Sept. 29, 1976). See also TEX. ATr'v GEN. Op. No. H-857 (1976)
(upholding constitutionality of TEX. TAX. ANN. art. 7150h (Vernon Supp. 1976-77), which grants
exemption from taxation for certain disabled veterans and their families); Comptroller's Ad
Valorem Tax Ruling .020 (duties of the Tax Assessor-Collector in granting exemptions under
article 7150h); TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-729 (1975) (fractional undivided interest of cities in
nuclear electric generating plants exempt from ad valorem taxes). See generally Irving Ind.
School Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 534 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (airline's leasehold interest in city-owned property and improvements exempt as "public
transportation facility" under TEX. TAX. ANN. art. 7173 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77)).
117. 539 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. 1976), appeal docketed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3355 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976) (No.
76-469).
118. San Marcos Consol. Ind. School Dist. v. Nance, 495 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 502 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1974); TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-d. See
also Klitgaard v. Gaines, 479 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
119. See TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-799 (1976) (explanation of method of assessing irrigated
agricultural land); TEX. ATr'v GEN. Op. No. H-863 (1976) (comparable sales of lands used for
agricultural purposes, if available and truly reflective of agricultural use factors, to be used by tax
assessor for valuation purposes).
120. Watts v. Alto Ind. School Dist., 537 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ)(final judgment not to be rendered at hearing on temporary injunction to restrain certification and
approval of tax roll); Crystal City Ind. School Dist. v. Johnson, 535 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ) (Board of Equalization final authority in establishing taxable
valuation of property within independent school districts and school trustees without power to
usurp this function); Johnson City Ind. School Dist. v. Crider, 535 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (to enjoin collection of tax because of some illegal feature,
taxpayer must show how the alleged illegality damaged him and that the damage to him was
substantial); Fayetteville Ind. School Dist. v. Crowley, 528 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (giving notice and opportunity to be heard jurisdictional as to Board of
Equalization's right to raise property values); TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-798 (1976) (amount of
maintenance tax leviable by a particular school district).
121. Dickinson Ind. School Dist. v. McGowan, 533 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston




VII. FEDERAL AND OTHER RELATED TAX MATTERS
Although more related to state than federal taxes, a federal court has
decided in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission123 that
the Multistate Tax Compact is a valid interstate agreement that does not
require congressional approval. Texas is a member of the Multistate Tax
Commission pursuant to article 7359a. 124 The plaintiffs in the U.S. Steel
case had challenged the constitutionality of the Compact. There have been
some recent cases and rulings in the federal tax area that affect Texas. In
Revenue Ruling 75-505125 it was decided that one-half of the value of a
survivorship annuity receivable under the Texas Judicial Retirement System
was includable in the decedent's gross estate as being paid under a
contract within the meaning of section 2039(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code. 126 Murphy v. United States127 concerned the dischargeability in a
bankruptcy proceeding of a 100 percent tax penalty for withholding and
F.I.C.A. taxes imposed against a responsible corporate officer under
I.R.C. § 6672.128 The United States had not filed a proof of claim for the
constitute payment of ad valorem taxes.) See also Muldrow v. Texas Frozen Foods, Inc., 157
Tex. 39, 299 S.W.2d 275 (1957).
122. Hanson v. Town of Flower Mound, 539 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976,
no writ) (tax not retroactive when levied on a date that is during the tax year for which the tax is
levied); McDannald v. League City, 528 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ 14th Dist.] 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (property owners' allegation that city's incorporation and subsequent adoption
of home rule charter was accompanied by fraud not a defense to assessment and collection of
delinquent ad valorem taxes); TEX. ATT'y GEN. Op. No. H-738 (1975) ("lease" of federal real
property which is mere security device to secure purchase price of parking facilities erected upon
the "leased" site conveys to "lessee" no separately taxable real property interest in erected
facilities); TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-849 (1976) (tax rate established on July 20, 1976, effective
for taxes becoming collectible on Oct. 1, 1976 and delinquent in 1977); TEX. ATT'v GEN. Op. No.
H-852 (1976) (permissible for city ordinance passed pursuant to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6574c (Vernon 1969) to provide that after microfilming, original public records may be destroyed
when at least five years old); TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-843 (1976) (when recorded and indexed,
abstract of in personam judgment lien against all non-exempt real property of defendant located
in county); TEX. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-851 (1976) (when city or school district taxing unit only
judgment creditor, no bids received in sale of realty to satisfy its tax lien and no request made by
city or school district, sheriff without authority to bid the property off to state or judgment
creditor taxing unit); TEX. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-885 (1976) (commissioner's court not required
to have annual audit of tax assessor's records); TEX. ATT'y GEN. OPEN REC. DEC. No. 140 (1976)
(information gathered and prepared concerning value of taxable property in certain school
districts held public information).
123. 417 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).
124. TEX. TAX. ANN. art. 7359a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). This act provides that the governor
will appoint the comptroller as the representative of the State of Texas on the Multistate Tax
Commission. See also Kinnear v. Hertz Corp., 86 Wash. 2d 407,545 P.2d 1186 (1976) (Multistate
Tax Commission has power and authority to conduct sales and use tax audit of taxpayer for
member states under joint audit provisions); TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. M-241 (1968) (credit
allowable for motor vehicle sales and use tax paid to another state); Comptroller's Sales Tax
Ruling .060-Multistate Tax Credits; Taylor, Multistate Tax Compact-Answer in the Battle with
Proponents of Federal Control Over State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 30 TEX. B.J. 773
(1967). See Hertz and U.S. Steel Decisions, 36 MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, MULTISTATE TAX
NEWSLETTER, Oct. 1976, at 1, 2, 5.
125. Rev. Rul. 75-505, 1975-2 C.B. 364.
126. I.R.C. § 2039(a).
127. 533 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Severance v. United States, No. 3-74-175F(N.D.
Tex. June 3, 1976) (dischargeability of 100% tax penalty also imposed against corporate officers).
For the authority of the bankruptcy court to determine dischargeability see In re Durensky, 377
F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Tex. 1974). See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5449(a) (Vernon Supp.
1976-77) (discharge of judgments and judgment liens against bankrupts).
128. I.R.C. § 6672.
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liability in the bankruptcy proceeding. The court held that even though a
claim had not been filed the bankruptcy court could adjudicate dischargea-
bility of the tax liability and that the section 6672 liability was a nondis-
chargeable tax rather than the discharageable penalty. Pursuant to a
Revenue Ruling 29 no gain or loss was required to be recognized on the
approximately equal division of the fair market value of community
property pursuant to a divorce settlement agreement that provided for the
transfer of assets to one spouse or the other. The assets received by each
spouse retained their community basis.
The greatest changes in the area of federal estate and gift taxes have
been occasioned by the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.130 The
many details of the Act cannot be covered here, but it should be noted'
that among other things the Act provides for estate and gift tax purposes a
unified credit of $47,000 by 1981, an increase in the maximum estate tax
marital deduction to the greater of $250,000 or one-half of the decedent's
adjusted gross estate, and an unlimited marital deduction for the first
$100,000 of lifetime transfers to a spouse.3 2 The unified credit of $47,000
is equivalent to an exemption of $175,625. The effect of this legislation
129. Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213. In comnunity property states a division of community
property incident to a divorce or a property settlement agreement may result in a taxable event.
Jean C. Carrieres, 64 T.C. 959 (1975). See also Rev. Rul. 76-312, 1976 I.R.B. No. 33, at 12 (estate
representatives given option as to date they choose to redeem U.S. Treasury ("flower") bonds
which are eligible for redemption at face value for credit in payment of the federal estate tax);
Rev. Rul. 76-100, 1976-1 C.B. 123 (community property trust and disposition of installment
obligations); Rev. Rul. 76-68, 1976-1 C.B. 216 (surviving spouse's basis for community property
United States Treasury bonds, redeemable at par in payment of federal estate tax, is fair market
value at date of other spouse's death rather than value for federal estate tax purposes). For
discussion of estate tax consequences regarding community property insurance policies where
spouses die in close succession, see McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30
Sw. L.J. 68,79(1976). Seealso Bothun Estate v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008, 1976-230
(1976) (transfer of interest in community property insurance policy by spouse beneficiary).
130. Tax Reform Act of 1976 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1548.
131. The Hon. Al UlIman, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, upon
introducing the Conference Report on H.R. 10612, 122 CONG. REC. H10,227 (daily ed. Sept. 16,
1976), said the following:
The major elements in the estate and gift tax package are an increase in the
estate tax threshold-the level at which estates become taxable-from the
current $60,000 to $175,000. This estate tax cut is phased in over a five year
period. In order not to benefit unduly the larger estates, this tax cut takes the form
of a credit in place of the $60,000 exemption; and existing rates, which range from
3 to 77 per cent, are replaced with a rate scheduling ranging from 18 to 70 per cent.
Other estate and gift tax reductions in the bill include an increase in the marital
deduction to permit larger tax-free transfers between husbands and wives ....
132. See Ray v. United States, 538 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1976) (treasury bonds purchased with
separate property loan proceeds separate, not community, property); First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 418 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (when insurance policy taken out on husband's life
payable to wife right to proceeds on wife's death before husband's death not community property
under Texas law and proceeds eventually realized entirely includable in husband's estate); Finley
v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (when decedent lacked legal capacity to
exercise general testamentary powers of appointment, property forming subject matter of power
not includable in decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes); Smith Estate v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 42 (1976) (marital deductions not barred by "equalization clause");
I.R.C. § 204 l(a)(2) (property subject to unexercised power of appointment to be included in gross
estate of decedent donee). For contrary holding see Fish v. United States, 432 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.
1970) (immaterial whether decedent donee had legal capacity to exercise power of appointment,
and inclusion of assets in decedent's gross estate determined by the existence of the power).
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will be the subject of much future interpretation and discussion. 33
133. See Discussion on Federal Tax Reform Bill, 40 FEDERATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS,
TAX ADMINISTRATORS NEWS, No. 10, Oct. 1976, at 110 (for property of a decedent purchased
before Dec. 31, 1976, the carryover basis in the hands of an heir will be its value as of that date,
increased by the amount of taxes paid on its transfer; for property purchased after 1976, the
carryover basis will be the decedent's basis immediately before his death increased by the taxes
paid on the property's transfer; the income tax minimum standard deduction has been changed
for single persons and for joint returns). See Tax Law Developments, 15 STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
REAL ESTATE, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW SEcTION REPORT, No. I, Oct. 1976, at 6-9, for discussion
of federal cases and rulings prior to new Act, including Lamkin v. United States, 533 F. 2d 303(5th Cir. 1976) (allocation of depreciation allowance between estate and future trust
beneficiaries).
